# title
Misinformation and Disinformation in Modern Warfare

# abstract
Assessing Distorted Information in Modern Warfare                   Distorted information (misinformation and disinformation) has long been a part of warfare (see the writings of Sun-Tzu). However, the study of the ever-increasing use of distorted information in modern warfare has been rather limited. In Misinformation and Disinformation in Modern Warfare, Chang, Keblis, Li, Iakovou, and White model instances of todays battlespace as a partially observable game with three agents, a leader and two followers, and examine the benefit to the leader (e.g., a military command) of modulating the communication of information between (i) followers who are adversaries and (ii) followers who are allies. Counter to intuition, the study shows that only under certain conditions is it optimal for the leader to degrade (enhance) the quality of the information communicated between adversarial (allied) followers. The developed methodology is applied to warfare instances encountered in the Battle of Mosul. Advanced information technology has changed the landscape of modern warfare, as it facilitates communication among nonconventional actors such as violent extremist groups. This paper examines the value of misinformation and disinformation to a military leader who through investment in people, programs, and technology is able to affect the accuracy of information communicated between other actors. We model the problem as a partially observable stochastic game with three agents, a leader and two followers. We determine the value to the leader of misinformation or disinformation being communicated between two: (i) adversarial and (ii) allied followers. We demonstrate that only under certain conditions, the prevalent intuition that the leader would benefit from less (more) accurate communication between adversarial (allied) followers is valid. We discuss why the intuition may fail and show the necessity of embracing both the reward structures and policies of agents to correctly manage information. Our research identifies efficient targeted investments to affect the accuracy of information in communication to the leaders advantage. We demonstrate the application of the developed methodology to warfare situations in the Battle of Mosul.

# authors[].organizations[].label
Mosbacher Institute for Trade, Economics, and Public Policy

# authors[].organizations[].label
Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station (TEES)

# publisher.label
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)

# authorList[]
Chang, Y., Keblis, M. F., Li, R., Iakovou, E., & White, C. C.